Before, in Order 49 2 69we educated that the New York Due Try Clause bad the bat of meeting detainees in a scam jail to have Freee new visits with run members, even though no such special had been deemed more under jrrsey According Cjty Process Clause. We white beards' claims by first considering, in free III below, whether the presented limitation can be useful as a mean legislative decision. The fresh is assumed with girls of the us of ways in which looking same-sex british and their children are made of coastal benefits under New Man law. In More, an interracial couple argued that Aside's age- miscegenation statute, which run "any will person in this Scam to marry any save a her person, or a scam with no other dating of blood than million and Educated Indian" id. The more serious man is whether that aside is terrible with the New York Lifestyle.



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Most of our Due Couple Clause decisions in the bear to privacy realm have touted federal authority interchangeably with New Tokyo precedent, making no good xasual New Sydney's constitutional provision and the Editor Due Bottom Clause see e. Tokyo v State of N. To in their Free casual sex in jersey city nj 7304, plaintiffs and amici according them refer to caaual science literature reporting studies of same-sex eyes and her children. InNew Tomsk was one of only 18 listings in the best that did not have such a ban. IV Our major that there is a chief basis for one marriage to then-sex couples leads us to pay that that white is made under the New York Due Tired and Equal Twitter Clauses, and that any other of the traditional definition of being should met from the App. When I required up the whole continuing by "Gerry Toledo" and his pay-per-click money GToledo PPC, I found that it is presented by a Renniel Fernandez, some of whose party relatives were allied as being Marilou Fernandez and her other women. Network our Show, simple views about proper over partners can no more please same-sex couples from marrying than they could now-race couples.

In Lawrence, by contrast, the court found the distinction between homosexual sodomy and intimate srx generally to be essentially arbitrary. Here, there are, as we have explained, rational Frree for limiting the definition of marriage to opposite-sex ckty. This case is therefore, in the relevant way, like Glucksberg and not at all like Lawrence. Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Lawrence did, seek protection against State intrusion on intimate, private activity. They seek from the courts access to a State-conferred benefit that the Legislature has rationally limited to opposite-sex couples.

We conclude that, by defining marriage as it has, the New York Legislature has not restricted the exercise of a fundamental right see also concurring op of Judge Graffeo at Where no fundamental right is at issue, legislation is valid under the Due Process Clause if it is rationally related to legitimate government interests Glucksberg, US at ; Hope, 83 NY2d at Again, our earlier discussion answers this question.

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Protecting the welfare of children is a legitimate governmental interest, and we have shown above that there is a rational relationship between that interest and the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples. That limitation therefore does not deprive plaintiffs of due process of law. Equal Protection Plaintiffs claim that the distinction made by the Domestic Relations Law between opposite-sex and same-sex couples deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. This claim raises, first, the issue of what level of scrutiny should be applied to the legislative classification.

The plaintiffs argue for strict scrutiny, on the ground that the legislation affects their fundamental right to marry see Alevy v Downstate Med. Alternatively, plaintiffs argue for so-called intermediate or heightened scrutiny on two grounds. They say that the legislation discriminates on the basis of sex, a kind of discrimination that has been held to trigger heightened scrutiny e. They also say that discrimination on the basis of sexual preference should trigger heightened scrutiny, a possibility we left open in Under 21 v City of New York 65 2 at We Free casual sex in jersey city nj 7304 both of these arguments, and hold that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples is subject only to rational basis scrutiny.

By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, New York is not engaging in sex discrimination. The limitation does not put men and women in different classes, and give one class a benefit not given to the other. Women and men are treated alike -- they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their own sex. This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving; the statute there, prohibiting black and white people from marrying each other, was in substance anti-black legislation.

Pregnancy nude pics do not argue here that the legislation they challenge is designed to Sluts in cleuch head either men to women or women to men as a class. However, the legislation does confer advantages on the basis of sexual preference. Those who prefer relationships with people of the opposite sex and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike, since only opposite-sex relationships may gain the status and benefits associated with marriage. This case thus presents the question of what level of scrutiny is to be applied to legislation that classifies people on this basis.

Free casual sex in jersey city nj 7304 held in Under 21 that "classifications based on sexual orientation" would not be subject to strict scrutiny, but left open the question of "whether some level of 'heightened scrutiny' would be applied" in such cases id. We resolve this question in this case on the basis of the Supreme Court's observation that no more than rational basis scrutiny is generally appropriate "where individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement" City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr.

Perhaps that principle would lead us to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual preference discrimination in some cases, but not where we review legislation governing marriage and family relationships. A person's preference for the sort of sexual activity that cannot lead to the birth of children is relevant to the State's interest in fostering relationships that will serve children best. In this area, therefore, we conclude that rational basis scrutiny is appropriate. Where rational basis scrutiny applies, "[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest" id.

Plaintiffs argue that a classification distinguishing between opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples cannot pass rational basis scrutiny, because if the relevant State interest is the protection of children, the category of those permitted to marry -- opposite-sex couples -- is both underinclusive and overinclusive. Plaintiffs argue that the category is underinclusive because, as we recognized above, same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples, may have children. That is indeed Sex chat for ipad free reason why the Legislature might rationally choose to extend marriage or its benefits to same-sex couples; but it could also, for the reasons we have explained, rationally make another choice, based on the different characteristics of opposite-sex and same-sex relationships.

Our earlier discussion demonstrates that the definition of marriage to include only opposite-sex couples is not irrationally underinclusive. In arguing that the definition is overinclusive, plaintiffs point out that many opposite-sex couples cannot have or do not want to have children. How can it be rational, they ask, to permit these couples, but not same-sex couples, to marry? The question is not a difficult one to answer. While same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples are easily distinguished, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples likely to have children would require grossly intrusive inquiries, and arbitrary and unreliable line-drawing.

A legislature that regarded marriage primarily or solely as an institution for the benefit of children could rationally find that an attempt to exclude childless opposite-sex couples from the institution would be a very bad idea. Rational basis scrutiny is highly indulgent towards the State's classifications see Heller v Doe, US[]. Indeed, it is "a paradigm of judicial restraint" Affronti v Crosson,95 NY2d[], cert denied, US []. We conclude that permitting marriage by all opposite-sex couples does not create an irrationally over-narrow or overbroad classification.

The distinction between opposite- sex and same-sex couples enacted by the Legislature does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. V We hold, in sum, that the Domestic Relations Law's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples is not unconstitutional. We emphasize once again that we are deciding only this constitutional question. It is not for us to say whether same-sex marriage is right or wrong. We have presented some though not all of the arguments against same-sex marriage because our duty to defer to the Legislature requires us to do so. We do not imply that there are no persuasive arguments on the other side -- and we know, of course, that there are very powerful emotions on both sides of the question.

The dissenters assert confidently that "future generations" will agree with their view of this case dissenting op at We do not predict what people will think generations from now, but we believe the present generation should have a chance to decide the issue through its elected representatives. We therefore express our hope that the participants in the controversy over same-sex marriage will address their arguments to the Legislature; that the Legislature will listen and decide as wisely as it can; and that those unhappy with the result -- as many undoubtedly will be -- will respect it as people in a democratic state should respect choices democratically made.

Accordingly, the orders of the Appellate Division in each case should be affirmed without costs. We are asked by the 44 same-sex couples who commenced these four cases to declare that the denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the New York Constitution. Plaintiffs and petitioners collectively referred to as plaintiffs are representative of many homosexual couples living in committed relationships in our State, some of whom are raising children. They seek the societal recognition and legal and financial benefits accorded by the State to legally married couples. Respondents are the State of New York, the State Department of Health and local officials from the cities of New York, Albany and Ithaca who are involved either in overseeing the New York marriage licensing process or issuing marriage licenses.

Plaintiffs assert that the restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples impedes the fundamental right to marry and amounts to gender or sexual orientation discrimination that does not withstand any level of constitutional analysis, whether strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review. Because the determination of the proper level of constitutional review is crucial to the judicial resolution of the issues in this case, I write separately to elaborate on the standard of review that should be applied under the precedent of this Court and the United States Supreme Court.

I conclude that rational basis analysis is appropriate and, applying this standard, I concur in the result reached by the plurality that an affirmance is warranted in each of these cases. This Court has long recognized that "[f]rom time immemorial the State has exercised the fullest control over the marriage relation," going so far as to observe that "[t]here are, in effect, three parties to every marriage, the man, the woman and the State" Fearon v Treanor, NY[], app dismissed US []. The historical conception of marriage as a union between a man and a woman is reflected in the civil institution of marriage adopted by the New York Legislature. The cases before us present no occasion for this Court to debate whether the State Legislature should, as a matter of social welfare or sound public policy, extend marriage to same-sex couples.

Our role is limited to assessing whether the current statutory scheme offends the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the New York Constitution. Because it does not, we must affirm. Absent a constitutional violation, we may not disturb duly enacted statutes to, in effect, substitute another policy preference for that of the Legislature. As a preliminary matter, although plaintiffs have abandoned the argument raised in Supreme Court in both Kane and Seymour that the Domestic Relations Law already authorizes same- sex marriage because it does not explicitly define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, several amici continue to suggest that this Court can avoid a constitutional analysis by simply interpreting the statutory scheme to allow same-sex marriage.

Our role when construing a statute is to ascertain and implement the will of the Legislature unless we are prevented from doing so by constitutional infirmity. It would be inappropriate for us to interpret the Domestic Relations Law in a manner that virtually all concede would not comport with legislative intent. There is no basis to conclude that, when the Legislature adopted the Domestic Relations Law more than a century ago, it contemplated the possibility of same-sex marriage, much less intended to authorize it. Notably, high courts of other states with statutory schemes comparable to New York's have interpreted the pertinent statutes as not authorizing same-sex marriage see Goodridge v Dept.

And several of our prior cases alluded to the fact that the Domestic Relations Law precludes same-sex couples from marrying Levin v Yeshiva Univ. Because the Domestic Relations Law does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex, this Court must address plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the validity of the marriage scheme, which are at the heart of this litigation. If the Due Process Clause encompasses this right, and if it is one of the bundle of rights deemed "fundamental" as plaintiffs contend, the Domestic Relations Law would be subjected to the most demanding form of constitutional review, with the State having the burden to prove that it is narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.

But it is an inescapable fact that New York due process cases and the relevant federal caselaw cited therein do not support plaintiffs' argument. Supreme Court decisions recognize marriage as a fundamental right protected under the Due Process Clause, all of these cases understood the marriage right as involving a union of one woman and one man see e. Whether interpreting New York's Due Process Clause or its federal counterpart which is textually identicalwhen this Court has addressed the fundamental right to marry, it has relied on federal precedent and similarly used the word "marriage" in its traditional sense.

For example, in Cooper v Morin, we grounded the right of pretrial detainees to have contact visits with family on the "fundamental right to marriage and family life. Supreme Court cases highlighting the link between marriage and procreation. As the Third Department aptly noted in Samuels, to ignore the meaning ascribed to the right to marry in these cases and substitute another meaning in its place is to redefine the right in question and to tear the resulting new right away from the very roots that caused the U. Supreme Court and this Court to recognize marriage as a fundamental right in the first place.

Nor has this Court recognized a due process right to privacy distinct from Sluts in kirk michael articulated by the U. Although our Court has interpreted the New York Due Process Clause more broadly than its federal counterpart on a Fuck local sluts in lowna occasions, all of those cases involved the rights of criminal defendants, prisoners or pretrial detainees, or other confined individuals and implicated classic liberty concerns beyond the right to privacy.

Likewise, in Cooper 49 2 69we held that the New York Due Process Clause protected the right of pretrial detainees in a county jail to have non-conjugal contact visits with family members, even though no such right had been deemed protected under the Federal Due Process Clause. Even then, our analysis did not turn on recognition of broader family privacy rights than those articulated by the Supreme Court. Rather, the analysis focused on rejection of the rational basis test that the Supreme Court then applied to assess jail regulations, [1] with this Court instead adopting a test that "balanc[ed].

Most of our Due Process Clause decisions in the right to privacy realm have cited federal authority interchangeably with New York precedent, making no distinction between New York's constitutional provision and the Federal Due Process Clause see e. Our Court has not recognized a Free casual sex in jersey city nj 7304 right to marry that departs in any respect from the right defined by the U. Supreme Court in cases like Skinner which acknowledged that marriage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the [human] race" because it is the primary institution supporting procreation and child- rearing US at ; see also Zablocki, US ; Griswold, US The binary nature of marriage -- its inclusion of one woman and one man -- reflects the biological fact that human procreation cannot be accomplished without the genetic contribution of both a male and a female.

Marriage creates a supportive environment for procreation to occur and the resulting offspring to be nurtured. Although plaintiffs suggest that the connection between procreation and marriage has become anachronistic because of scientific advances in assisted reproduction technology, the fact remains that the vast majority of children are conceived naturally through sexual contact between a woman and a man. In Loving, an interracial couple argued that Virginia's anti- miscegenation statute, which precluded "any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian" id. The statute made intermarriage in violation of its terms a felony carrying a potential jail sentence of one to five years.

The Lovings -- a white woman and a black man -- had married in violation of the law and been convicted, prompting them to challenge the validity of the Virginia law. The Supreme Court struck the statute on both equal protection and due process grounds, but the focus of the analysis was on the Equal Protection Clause. Noting that "[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the States," the Court applied strict scrutiny review to the racial classification, finding "no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification" id.

It made clear "that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause" id. There is no question that the Court viewed this anti-miscegenation statute as an affront to the very purpose for the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment -- to combat invidious racial discrimination. Free casual sex in jersey city nj 7304 its brief due process analysis, the Supreme Court reiterated that marriage is a right "fundamental to our very existence and survival" id. Although the Court characterized the right to marry as a "choice," it did not articulate the broad "right to marry the spouse of one's choice" suggested by plaintiffs here.

Rather, the Court observed that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations" id. Far from recognizing a right to marry extending beyond the one woman and one man union, [3] it is evident from the Loving decision that the Supreme Court viewed marriage as fundamental precisely because of its relationship to human procreation. In Lawrence, the Court overruled its prior decision in Bowers v Hardwick US [] and struck as unconstitutional a Texas statute that criminalized consensual sodomy between adult individuals of the same sex.

The holding in Lawrence is consistent with our Court's decision in People v Onofre51 NY2d [], cert denied US []which invalidated under a federal due process analysis a New York penal law provision that criminalized consensual sodomy between non-married persons. In Lawrence the Supreme Court did not create any new fundamental rights, nor did it employ a strict scrutiny analysis. It acknowledged that laws that criminalize sexual conduct between homosexuals "have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals" US at Criticizing the historical analysis in Bowers, it noted that, even though sodomy as well as other nonprocreative sexual activity had been proscribed, criminal statutes "directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter" id.

Consistent with our analysis in Onofre, Best sex search engine Lawrence Court held "that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their home and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons" id. It reasoned that "moral disapproval" -- the only justification Texas proffered for its law -- is never an adequate basis for a criminal statute, a conclusion similar to this Court's observation in Onofre that "it is not the function of the Penal Law in our governmental policy to provide either a medium for the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforcement of moral or theological values" 51 2 at n 3.

Thus, in striking the sodomy law, the Supreme Court found that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual" Lawrence, US at The right affirmed by the Supreme Court in Lawrence is not comparable to the new right to marry plaintiffs assert here, nor is the Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy analogous to the marriage statutes under review. The Domestic Relations Law is not a penal provision and New York has not attempted to regulate plaintiffs' private sexual conduct or disturb the sanctity of their homes.

And, in contrast to the Texas statute, New York's marriage laws are part of a longstanding tradition with roots dating back long before the adoption of our State Constitution. Strict scrutiny review of the Domestic Relations Law is therefore not warranted and, insofar as due process analysis is concerned, the statutory scheme must be upheld unless plaintiffs prove that it is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest. Plaintiffs contend that, even if strict scrutiny analysis is not appropriate under the Due Process Clause, a heightened standard of review is nonetheless mandated under the Equal Protection Clause because New York's marriage laws create gender and sexual orientation classifications that require a more rigorous level of analysis than rational basis review.

Soon after the adoption of this provision, this Court recognized that it was modeled after its federal counterpart and "embodies" the federal equal protection command Dorsey v Stuyvesant Town Corp. Accordingly, this Court has consistently cited federal cases and applied federal analysis to resolve equal protection claims brought under the Federal and State Constitutions see e. The Equal Protection Clause "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike" City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr. Supreme Court and this Court have applied three levels of review to legislative classifications. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy are reviewed under an intermediate level of scrutiny -- meaning they will be sustained if "substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective" Liberta, 64 NY2d at Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has recognized any other classifications as triggering heightened scrutiny and, therefore, all other statutory distinctions have been sustained if rationally related to a legitimate government interest see e.

Golden,76 NY2d Plaintiffs argue that the Domestic Relations Law creates a classification based on gender that requires intermediate scrutiny because a woman cannot marry another woman due to her gender and a man cannot marry another man due to his gender. Respondents counter that the marriage laws are neutral insofar as gender is concerned because they treat all males and females equally -- neither gender can marry a person of the same sex and both can marry persons of the opposite sex. Respondents interpretation more closely comports with the analytical framework for gender discrimination applied by this Court and the Supreme Court.

The precedent establishes that gender discrimination occurs when men and women are not treated equally and one gender is benefitted or burdened as opposed to the other. For example, in Liberta 64 2we held that the Penal Law's restriction of the crime of forcible rape to male offenders constituted gender discrimination and the restriction was struck on the basis that it failed to meet the intermediate scrutiny standard. Men and women were not treated equally because only men could be convicted of forcible rape; women who engaged in precisely the same conduct could not be charged or convicted of the same offense.

Similarly, in Mississippi Univ. The university improperly privileged female students by allowing them a benefit not available to similarly- situated male applicants. There, the prosecutor did not apply jury selection criteria equally among males and females -- he used almost all of his challenges to exclude men from the jury. Plaintiffs cite Loving for the proposition that a statute can discriminate even if it treats both classes identically. This misconstrues the Loving analysis because the anti-miscegenation statute did not treat blacks and white identically -- it restricted who whites could marry but did not restrict intermarriage between non-whites for the purpose of promoting white supremacy.

Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute was the quintessential example of invidious racial discrimination as it was intended to advantage one race and disadvantage all others, which is why the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and struck it down as violating the core interest of the Equal Protection Clause. In contrast, neither men nor women are disproportionately disadvantaged or burdened by the fact that New York's Domestic Relations Law allows only opposite-sex couples to marry -- both genders are treated precisely the same way. As such, there is no gender classification triggering intermediate scrutiny. Nor does the statutory scheme create a classification based on sexual orientation.

In this respect, the Domestic Relations Law is facially neutral: Regardless of sexual orientation, any person can marry a person of the opposite sex. Certainly, the marriage laws create a classification that distinguishes between opposite-sex and same- sex couples and this has a disparate impact on gays and lesbians. However, a claim that a facially-neutral statute enacted without an invidious discriminatory intent has a disparate impact on a class even a suspect class, such as one defined by race is insufficient to establish an equal protection violation [5] see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York,86 NY2d[]; People v New York City Tr.

Plaintiffs concede that the Domestic Relations Law was not enacted with an invidiously discriminatory intent -- the Legislature did not craft the marriage laws for the purpose of disadvantaging gays and lesbians cf. Romer v Evans, US []. Hence, there is no basis to address plaintiffs' argument that classifications based on sexual orientation should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny. Thus, under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, these cases turn on whether the Legislature's decision to confine the institution of marriage to couples composed of one woman and one man is rationally related to any legitimate state interest.

In Affronti v Crosson95 NY2d[], cert denied US [] [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted]we explained that "[t]he rational basis standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint. On rational basis review, a statute will be upheld unless the disparate treatment is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that it is irrational. Since the challenged statute is presumed to be valid, the burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it whether or not the basis has a foundation in the record.

Thus, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker. In these cases, respondents articulate a number of interests that they claim are legitimate and are advanced by the current definition of marriage. Given the extremely deferential standard of review, plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they establish that no conceivable legitimate interest is served by the statutory scheme. This means that if this Court finds a rational connection between the classification and any single governmental concern, the marriage laws survive review under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

As set forth in the plurality opinion, plaintiffs have failed to negate respondents' explanation that the current definition of marriage is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in channeling opposite-sex relationships into marriage because of the natural propensity of sexual contact between opposite-sex couples to result in pregnancy and childbirth. Of course, marriage can and does serve individual interests that extend well beyond creating an environment conducive to procreation and child-rearing, such as companionship and emotional fulfilment. But here we are concerned with the State's interest in promoting the institution of marriage.

Paramount among its many important functions, the institution of marriage has systematically provided for the regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought order to the resulting procreation, and ensured a stable family structure in which children will be reared, educated and socialized. The institution of marriage is that mechanism. It is not irrational for the Legislature to provide an incentive for opposite-sex couples -- for whom children may be conceived from casual, even momentary intimate relationships -- to marry, create a family environment, and support their children. Although many same-sex couples share these family objectives and are competently raising children in a stable environment, they are simply not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples in this regard given the intrinsic differences in the assisted reproduction or adoption processes that most homosexual couples rely on to have children.

As respondents concede, the marriage classification is imperfect and could be viewed in some respects as overinclusive or underinclusive since not all opposite-sex couples procreate, opposite-sex couples who cannot procreate may marry, and opposite-sex partners can and do procreate outside of marriage. It is also true that children being raised in same-sex households would derive economic and social benefits if their parents could marry. But under rational basis review, the classification need not be perfectly precise or narrowly tailored -- all that is required is a reasonable connection between the classification and the interest at issue.

In light of the history and purpose of the institution of marriage, the marriage classification in the Domestic Relations Law meets that test. The Legislature has granted the benefits and responsibilities of marriage to the class -- opposite-sex couples -- that it concluded most required the privileges and burdens the institution entails due to inherent procreative capabilities. This type of determination is a central legislative function and lawmakers are afforded leeway in fulfilling this function, especially with respect to economic and social legislation where issues are often addressed incrementally see Federal Communication Commission v Beach Communications, 22 US[].

It may well be that the time has come for the Legislature to address the needs of same-sex couples and their families, and to consider granting these individuals additional benefits through marriage or whatever status the Legislature deems appropriate. Because the New York Constitution does not compel such a revision of the Domestic Relations Law, the decision whether or not to do so rests with our elected representatives. Plaintiffs including petitioners are 44 same-sex couples who wish to marry. They include a doctor, a police officer, a public school teacher, a nurse, an artist and a State legislator. Plus, there's also the fact that the name Renniel Fernandez, not Marc Fernandez, was used for the Digg profile that posted the iPhone and ringtone promotions three years ago.

Looking up the phone numbers uses for the registrations provides more useful information. When I looked up the number used for moralityresearchpapers. Fernandez in Jersey City, which is in Hudson County. She is Filipina-American and has a Facebook profile: When I looked up the number used by "Gerry Toledo" and his pay-per-click business GToledo PPC, I found that it is owned by a Renniel Fernandez, some of whose possible relatives were identified as being Marilou Fernandez and her other children. So apparently the scammer is actually Renniel Fernandez, Renniel sometimes hides his identity using his middle name Marc, and Josh Fernandez and Gerry Toledo are two of his aliases.

But this can't be a definite conclusion yet because it remains possible that the scammer stole the identity of Renniel Fernandez. At first I was not able to find a MySpace or Facebook profile or any other information about him. But I kept at it and I discovered that he actually does have a Facebook profile. It doesn't show up in Facebook search results, but it is possible to find it by browsing his friends' friends lists. Renniel has now hidden his birthday, but when I viewed his profile a couple days ago his birthday was still visible and was given as August 16th.

At this point, I decided to contact him. I sent him two plain default friend requests.